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conditioned by the environment in which convertibility proceeds,
any practicalproposal forconvertibilitymust firstaddress andanswer
a broader and deeper issue, namely: what is the appropriate nature,
sequence, and timing ofthe structural reforms required to create a
suitable and sustainable environment for successful trade
liberation?3agents have the unrestricted ability to exchange rubles (currency)
into other domestic means of payment (non-cash bank credits) and
intodomestic goods, services, real assets, andfinancial assets. Analo-
gously, full foreign ruble convertibility is established when all eco-
nomic agents have the unrestricted ability to exchange rubles into
foreign goods (current account) and foreign capital and currencyLhIInaLIinn.
Money in the Soviet Union
The inconvertible ruble’s monetary functions are very different.
The Soviet Union’s two-circuit payment system consists ofcash and
non-cash rubles. Cash rubles (currency) cannot be exchanaed forprecluding thediscovery, development, and exercise ofcomparative
advantage.7 Itexcluded the nation from integration with the expand-
ing world economy, depriving itofthe benefits ofimported technol-
ogy, foreign capital, and trade.
The Soviet Union now contemplates a substantial economictrans-
formation intended to replace centrallyplanned administrative con-mises economic nreeaom i~rrieumanana rrieaman nJou, pp.
134—35). Although it is impossible to assure equality ofoutcomes, it
is possible to create a level playing field by establishing full rights
to private ownership and an egalitarian distribution of economic
resources with which citizens can cast their economic votes.
From the Soviet perspective, the communist experiment has
LL J ~~ J ~ L~ ~restore monetary balance. Monopolypoweris rampantin the highly
concentrated industrial structure of the USSR. The combination of
shortages, lack ofcompetition, and soft budget constraints increases
the power of concentrated enterprises to charge high prices by
restrictingoutput. An essential featureofreformmustbethe breakup
of these monopoly elements. Only then would the stage be set forlaborers; and foreign investors, with the largest percentage being
equitably distributed directly to the nation’s citizens. State enter-
prises and collectives would be reorganized into smaller viable com-
petitive firms and incorporated, with newly issued equity shares
representing titled rights to ownership as well as claims to income.
A portion?~ these enterprise-specific shares would be earmarkeduuiI. iiic guveiiiuieiii woulu ~iiiipiy eu1I~LL uiviueiiu payiiicu~s on
its citizen shares in lieu of taxes. The shares would appear as assets
on the government balance sheet, and the government could issue
its own liabilities against its assets. These fully backed government
liabilities could be soldto banks andthe public, enabling thecentral
bank to exercise monetary stabilization policies through conven-
fianal anal-n yyiarl,-a4- anaral-icn.-nc Ti-na fi,1 i_hn,-nlriii a raniiimamnnn-nt rnlnpacthe PI-OdUCflOnOf
consumer goods and services.
The inability of Soviet planners to match after-tax cash earnings
with the value of available goods and services creates a chronic
shortage of consumer goods and, consequently, an excess stock of
riihl~s (thi~ riihk ov~rh~nu~ th~it is ~w iimiihii-t-n~-lin thin fnrm nfhniisp-noarumg on consumer goous, capirat equipment, anu tue iorceusav-
ings of rubles (Birman 1980).
It is now well understood that macroeconomic balance assuring
stability ofthe general price level must precede the introduction of
marketmechanisms andprice reforms (McKinnon 1989).Otherwise,
relative price signals would be swampedby general price increases,Tas~1in ,,n;IIt.~t-nn
Expenditure reductions will require smaller investment and mili-
tary outlays. The replacement ofcentral planning with marketmech-
anismswill significantly reduce expenditures by cuttinggovernment
payrolls, suspending subsidiestounprofitableenterprises,andelimi-
n~tinup,cistinci siihsidi~ns ~ unndct8 Thinsin oh~,nuincc~ln~nin mial-nt hnn~_JItIL.t_,II LJIICtI tji~
The socialistpnivatization ofsome 46,000stateenterprises requires
that they be reconstituted as corporationswith limited liability. Cor-
porate ownership would be evidenced by title to tradeable equity
shares in each of the currently operating enterprises, entitling the
owners of the shares to full participatiou in dividend distributionsment liabilities that can be sold by the central bank to commercial
banks and the public.
Beingfullybacked by the real assetsrepresented bycitizen shares,
these government liabilities establish a sound basis for executing
monetarypolicy through openmarket operations bythe central bank.
Moreover, the equity shares in government hands provide a sourceLiI~t hIiU~L LIIICULI7 ain-ct-t tAlOn! wOnrUOInnn.
Gaining Monetary Equilibrium and Public
Confidence
Socialistprivatization envisions that 50 percentofall citizen share
bundles will be distributed in equalshares toeach andevery citizen.;;;; ;;~i~ p;O;;d;p05;;
loan services. Consequently, it performs an iudispensible function
of introducing and educating the public in the use ofbasic banking
facilities.
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ofdynamic industrial reorganization. Newly established companies
withindependentsources ofcapitalwould be encouragedto compete
with existing enterprises in order to eliminate residual monopoly
profits.
Proper valuation ofequity shares requires that investors havesuf~
f nanf ,nfa..mnnl-inn 4-rn famm rnncnnn k1~n’unnn+nt-inn it alintif nmacan4-resides with its managers and workers. The richest source of skills
forvaluing equity shares is to be found in the international financial
and entrepreneurial community. It is therefore essential that both of
these sources be given incentives toenlist theirknowledgeand skills
hi ~ttnin iinnrnnricite sh~ireviilirntinns cit the niihlir cnirtinnsthe Soviet equivalent of the Dow Jones index—would be promi-
nently published in every Soviet newspaper and serve as a visible
indicator of the progress ofperestroika reforms. Confidence in the
reforms will be bolsteredby rising share values anda steady stream
of dividend payments to shareholders.
During this crucial period, the aggregate value ofcitizen shares is~i~i:~ ~edib1~ ;olicy that canbe SUStainedOverthe longe
term is to be preferred to a “quick fix” solution that risks longer tern
policy reversal.
The reallocation of military and investment expenditures to con
sumer goods will also help to improve available supplies. U-neon
strainedmarketorices will nrovide information and incentivesi~nal~t-ann It-ILIIUnt-t- UtInt-n IOlUlInn OllUn t~3~ ith UV t-ILtIfl t-UnnLnILfiULLUnn 10 nnat-iy LU
be small in comparison with more fundamental systemic
restructuring.
Weare witnessingahistorically unprecedented reform effort, both
in its nature and scope. If convertibility is to be attained and main-
tained, the structuralreforms mustsucceedin establishing macroeco-
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the means of production in the hands of the state and directing
the economy bureaucratically according to a central plan. It is nov~
increasingly acknowledged that the experiment did not succeed it
attaining its goals. Yet paradoxically, the failed experiment has cre-
ated a unique onnortunitv to salvage its goals by now undertaking nDepartment ofEconomics, Columbia University, October 1989.
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